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Responsibilities of Directors of Not-for-Profit
Corporations Faced with Sharing Control
with Other Nonprofit Organizations in
Health Industry Affiliations:
A Commentary on Legal and
Practical Realities
L. Edward Bryant, Jr.*
This Commentary addresses the issue of defining the legal responsibilities of directors of health industry not-for-profit corporations considering mergers and other types of affiliations with
other not-for-profit organizations. With numerous hospital consolidation transactions taking place in recent years and many
more on the horizon, directors are appropriately asking about
their duties, their constraints, their discretion, and their legal or
financial exposure. The decisions being made on proposed affiliations both threaten and assure substantial change in the way
long-standing nonprofit community institutions will relate to
and serve the public in the future. Therefore, it is important to
analyze and clarify the roles of directors participating in these
crucial decisions.
The law on director responsibilities is fairly clear. However,
the emotions and the psychology accompanying transactions involving not-for-profit institutions sometimes obscure the legal
analysis. Too often, a would-be transaction is framed and announced and subsequently fails to meet some unanticipated
legal constraint.
It is not sufficient simply to say that the nonprofit director is a
fiduciary, meaning that he or she makes affiliation decisions on
behalf of others. Knowing that the decision whether or not to
affiliate is neither personal nor proprietary does not say enough
about how the affiliation decision should be addressed or what
decision-making criteria should be considered. Much more is
required.
* Mr. Bryant is a partner with the Chicago office of Gardner, Carton & Douglas,
where he founded the health law department in 1979. He received his Bachelor of
Arts and his Juris Doctor from Northwestern University.
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This Commentary will not address the entirely different question of transactions through which a not-for-profit hospital sells
its assets to or joint ventures its operations with a for-profit hospital. In these cases, the law is equally clear, but the directors
have substantially less discretion. Moreover, in an affiliation
with a for-profit entity, the directors find themselves in the proverbial "goldfish bowl," under increasingly intense legally required scrutiny from state and federal agencies to assure that
the transaction is conducted at arm's length and for fair market
value. Nonprofit directors' mandated legal duties in transactions or joint ventures with for-profits are not the same as for
nonprofit transactions; they vary substantially from state to state
because of recently enacted state statutes regulating conversions
of nonprofit organizations.They are also colored by external factors such as the reputation of the for-profit buyer and the current political agenda of the state's attorney general.
Similarly, the substantial body of corporate law defining the
duties of directors of publicly held companies to hold out for the
best price in a sale of the company or its assets in order to serve
the best interests of the shareholders does not apply to nonprofit organizations. In a transaction between two not-for-profit
corporations, much more than money is at stake, and directors
are given greater discretion for that very reason.
The two foregoing caveats do not address the impact upon an
affiliation transaction between two nonprofit hospitals in which
one or both hospitals have for-profit affiliates or subsidiaries.'
Nonprofit organizations utilize for-profit subsidiaries for a
number of reasons, usually for tactical tax-planning purposes
not available if the subsidiary's activities produce income that
would be considered unrelated business taxable income
("UBTI") 2 if conducted within the tax-exempt organization. 3
1. For-profit affiliates of nonprofit corporations are neither new nor controversial.
A nonprofit corporation invests its reserves like any organization having reserves, and
there is no conceptual difference between owning 1000 shares of publicly traded Baxter International and all the shares of ABC, Inc. Most nonprofit health systems in the
United States own the controlling interest in one or more taxable business organizations which qualify as subsidiaries. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-31-058 (May 9, 1991);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-05-026 (Nov. 12, 1992).
2. Internal Revenue Service regulation of UBTI falls under 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-514
(1994). See THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, §§ 401-10 (1988).
3. For example, income over expense from the sale of pharmaceuticals to hospital
inpatients and outpatients does not produce taxable income for a tax-exempt hospital.
However, if the same patient with the same physician, the same diagnosis, and the
same prescription returned to the hospital pharmacy later as a so-called "referred
outpatient" of the pharmacy, income over allocable expense would be taxable under
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Whatever the reason, the stock of a for-profit affiliate or subsidiary is an asset of the not-for-profit organization and should be
viewed as one of its investments. The hospital director, in considering an affiliation, should determine whether the hospital's
investments will be included in the affiliation transaction. While
this could go either way, excluding a for-profit affiliate which
has operations integral to the hospital (such as a physician-hospital organization 4 established to arrange managed care contracts or a controlled self-insurance group purchasing
organization 5) could be a terrible mistake for the future of the
affiliated organizations. 6
Although the presence of a for-profit affiliate affects the due
diligence process, it usually does not complicate the legal aspects of the transaction any more than if the hospitals owned
1000 shares of General Motors. Practically, the most frequent
impact of a for-profit affiliate is the likelihood that due diligence
will bring to light how unsuccessfully hospital personnel have
operated the for-profit business. Often the subsidiary is heavily
in debt to the tax-exempt shareholder because hospitals frequently undercapitalize a subsidiary's equity and then lend it
substantial sums in a manner which, upon repayment with interest, creates unwanted UBTI for the shareholder.7
The transaction legal rules alluded to above are not necessarily implicated when a not-for-profit organization has both forprofit and nonprofit suitors. Directors of nonprofits retain substantial discretion when choosing among competing suitors and
dollars are not the sole consideration. The law makes clear that
the public interest is the most important factor. There is no duty
Section 511 of the Internal Revenue Code. If a hospital has several sources of taxable
income, offsetting operating profits against losses for good tax planning purposes is
often easier with a subsidiary business corporation.
4. In the health care lexicon, physician-hospital organizations are known as PHOs.
A PHO is usually controlled equally by a hospital and its medical staff. Because the
functions of a PHO usually do not serve a tax-exempt purpose, most PHOs are not
entitled to an exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
5. See Nonprofits' Ins. Alliance of Calif. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 277 (1994).
The exception would be those specific goods or services described in Section 501(e) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
6. Hospital directors negotiating a hospital merger, but holding an important affiliate or subsidiary out of the transaction, may be endangering the future of the merged
organization's operations. Due diligence will usually demonstrate the affiliate's actual
importance.
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 512(b)(13) (1994). Directors might also wish to "clean up" the
balance sheet of the for-profit affiliate before due diligence to avoid the appearance
that the board neglected a material investment.
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to accept the highest bid or to accept a hypothetical $25 million
purchase offer from a for-profit proposed purchaser when a
competing nonprofit offer might be limited to assuming a hypothetical $10 million in debt and being committed to provide a
designated amount of free care to the community.
I.

ANCILLARY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: THE FIRST SET
OF LEGAL DUTIES

There are no purely hypothetical hospital affiliation transactions except on law school examinations. Thus, the legal duties
of directors in merger transactions 8 are never exercisable or exercised in a vacuum. Most boards, on behalf of their corporations, enter into contracts that restrict the corporation's
activities and future transactions. These contractual obligations
are usually serious and formal enough that the other contracting
party has the legal authority to enforce its rights in court. 9 Common examples of these contractual obligations include the
following:
* Bond indenture debt service and similar covenants;
* Donor restrictions on gifts for special purposes or uses;
* Possibilities of reverter and reversions on real estate titles
for changes in control or purpose;
* Member-reserved powers regarding corporate purposes;
" Member-reserved powers regarding transaction approval
procedures;
* Supermajority vote requirements in bylaws that effectively
grant a veto to another party;
* Rights of first refusal in favor of others;
* Binding commitments to the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Healthcare Facilities; and
* "Change-in-control" severance provisions in executive employment agreements.
8. The title of this Commentary refers to "affiliations." This text will treat "mergers" and "affiliations" interchangeably because the transactions being discussed could
involve one of several legal formats (i.e., mergers, consolidations, asset transfers, joint
operating companies, change in membership, or the creation of new or shared membership), all having the legal effect of a merger. The Federal Trade Commission Department of Justice merger guidelines, for example, apply to all transactions having
the legal effect of a merger. Interestingly, the parties to such nonprofit transactions
usually prefer to call them "affiliations" because that term sounds less radical or less
final than "merger" or "purchase."
9. See, e.g., Little v. Chicago Woman's Bowling Ass'n, 84 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ill.
App. 1949); Busbey v. Chicago Athletic Ass'n, 228 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ill. App. 1967).
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The first set of legal duties confronting directors 10 contemplating a hospital merger requires the directors to honor all binding
contractual obligations contained in agreements or organizational documents. Preexisting contractual obligations sometimes
guide the format of affiliation transactions. For example,
although a statutory merger might be preferred, 1 the parties
might instead structure the transaction as a change of membership to avoid refinancing both hospitals' sets of bonds.12 The
due diligence process is designed in part to identify preexisting
contractual obligations. Ignorance of contractual obligations is
no excuse, and forming affiliations in violation of them often
produces litigation by those who are harmed by such violations.
Many hospital affiliation transactions progress past the public
disclosure point without adequate attention having been paid to
the identification and resolution of all possible contractual infeasibilities. When this happens, the affiliating parties are often
embarrassed or angry for not having alerted each other to the
preexisting contractual obligations, increasing the likelihood of
an unsuccessful transaction.
II.

MANDATORY STATUTORY PROCEDURAL LAWS: THE
SECOND SET OF LEGAL DUTIES

The second set of directors' legal duties is to obey the local,
state, and federal laws that apply procedural structure to nonprofit affiliation transactions. These mandatory procedural requirements fall conceptually into five categories.
10. While this discussion pertains to the legal duties of not-for-profit directors, the
same duties apply to corporate officers. In many nonprofit hospitals, some or all of
the officers also are directors (e.g., board chairs and vice chairs, chief executive officers who are ex officio directors, and even some corporate secretaries and treasurers). When officers are not directors, they are direct agents of the board in the
implementation of board-established policy. This Commentary also uses the term "directors" to describe the participants on a corporation's governing body because that
term is used in the Model Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, REVISED MODEL NON-

PROFr CORP. Acr, pt 8 (1986), and in the laws of most states. See, e.g., 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 105/108.05 (West 1996). Some states still refer to governance participants as "trustees." The terms "directors" and "trustees" may be used
interchangeably.
11. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/111.05-111.55 (West 1996).
12. As long as one hospital is not being asked to guarantee the debt of its new
affiliate and is able to meet a specified debt service ratio, most bond indentures do not
address changes in membership and therefore allow them to occur without penalty or
default.
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Hart-Scott-Rodino Act

First, members and directors contemplating an affiliation must
notify several government agencies of pending transactions. The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197613 mandates a thirty day pre-transaction notification to the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") for affiliations large enough to have
the effect of a merger, a purchase, or a corporate joint venture
and involving interstate commerce. The FTC, working with the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), then determines whether
the effect of the transaction may be substantially to lessen competition under section 7 of the Clayton Act. an Failure to file for
pre-transaction review may prompt sanctions, including fines
and injunctions.15 A determination by the FTC or the DOJ that
the transaction may lessen competition is likely 16to produce an
action for injunctive relief to stop the affiliation.
B.

Certificate of Need

Many changes in control or ownership require the controlling
organization to acquire either a Certificate of Need ("CON")
with relicensure or an express exemption from CON, without
which state licensure may be denied. 17 Assuming that the affiliation transaction itself does not create new institutional services,"' increase beds, 19 or close health care facilities,20
experience has shown that CON exemption, if applicable, and
relicensure are pro forma and rarely controversial. 2 '
13. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1) (1994).
14. See id. § 12.
15. See id. § 18a(g).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
17. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3960/13.1 (West 1996). Certificate of Need laws
are state statutes that require state approval before healthcare institutions may expand their facilities.
18. See id. 3960/5(b) (requiring a CON if the transaction "substantially changes
the scope or changes the functional operation of the facility").
19. The Illinois Certificate of Need statute requires an increase of more than ten
beds or more than ten percent of total bed capacity. See id. 3960/3.
20. Discontinuance is included within the definition of "construction or modification" (such changes usually occur after the closing date and only upon contemporaneous compliance with all regulatory standards). See id. 3960/3.
21. See id. 3960/6; 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77 § 1130.650 (1991). For a very interesting exception in which the exemption was anything but pro forma, see Franciscan
Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Illinois Health FacilitiesPlanningBd., No. 97 CH 013546
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (pending).
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C.

Medicare and Medicaid

The federal Medicare and Medicaid laws provide that changes
in control or ownership require notice and recertification for
participation in these important programs. 22 Like CON procedures, recertification for Medicare and Medicaid is ordinarily
neither controversial nor time-consuming and follows relicensure. Both may often be accomplished without special resurvey
if the hospital's survey record is already a good one. The unique
"deemed status" of Medicare certification upon a successful accreditation survey by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO") 23 assures that JCAHO
will always have accreditation rules applicable to hospital affiliations which are acceptable to the Medicare program.24
D.

Employment Issues

If affiliations are accompanied by wholesale employee terminations or facilities closures, federal labor law requires that certain notices be given to employees.
E. Referenda
Referendum approval of affiliations may be required when
real property involved in the transaction is owned or controlled
by a municipal corporation.2 6
Directors who participate in authorizing transactions that do
not comply with the applicable procedural laws will find that
their decisions can be and usually are nullified by legal action,
which produces expense, delay, and, on occasion, an inability to
complete the transaction. The existence of these procedural duties usually results in a transaction agreement containing several
contingencies to deal with the various possible outcomes of one
or all of the procedural requirements, which are expressly
spelled out in the agreement.
22. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.18 (1997).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1994).
24. If the "deemer" clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) was repealed, the JCAHO
might be thought by many to be a redundant and, therefore, an unnecessary source of
expense.
25. See 29 U.S.C § 2102 (1994).
26. Increasingly, municipal corporations, including counties, townships, and special districts, are statutorily repealing referendum requirements. But, when a city
council may lack the nerve to make an affiliation decision on its own, it may vote to
hold an "advisory" referendum. Advisory referenda have effectively killed some hospital affiliations.
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CONTEXTUAL LEGAL DUTIES: THE THIRD SET OF
LEGAL DUTIES

More important to the eventual success or failure of a possible hospital merger or affiliation than "whom do I notify?" are
the questions, "what attitude should both sets of directors bring
to the table?" and "does the law require anything of us as we
negotiate?" While procedural in nature, the third set of legal
duties is contextual; these duties stem more from the nature of
the organizations than from the type of transaction.
Both state and federal legal standards apply to the contextual
duties. Assuming both not-for-profit and federal tax-exempt
status for the hospital parties, the applicable state not-for-profit
corporation enabling statute and the Internal Revenue Code establish a context within which the parties must work together in
conceiving, designing, and implementing their transaction. Directors are bound by law to follow these contextual rules in considering affiliations,27 but these rules are less black and white
and much more gray than other legal standards. The general duties for directors of nonprofit, tax-exempt corporations govern
all corporate decisions and are not specific to affiliation decisions. Therefore, there may be a tendency to assume that directors are already fully aware of these duties. However, directors
should be reminded of these fundamentals because all outside
parties or observers will certainly measure director performance
by these standards.
The contextual legal requirements, taken from state and federal enactments, may be summarized in a series of directives for
nonprofit directors, stated as follows: (1) Act in good faith. (2)
Remember that it is the public and not the board that "owns"
the not-for-profit corporation. (3) Avoid willful or wanton conduct intended to be harmful to others or conscious disregard for
the well-being of others. (4) Act in the best interests of the corporation being served.
These generic legal duties, in turn, translate into slightly different, but clear and measurable standards of conduct for nonprofit directors:
27. There are some critically important relationships that hospitals must avoid
under the Medicare Fraud and Abuse Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-71(a), (b) (1994), and
the Patient Protection Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1993), but these are not
unique to hospital mergers or affiliations because they apply even in the absence of a
merger. Accordingly, compliance with these standards is primarily a mutual due diligence concern that should be considered prior to the consummation of a hospital
merger.
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* Identify and deal appropriately with all actual and appar-

ent conflicts and dualities of interest so as to avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
* Document precisely why the directors reasonably believe

the best interests of both the corporation and the public
are served by the specific transaction under consideration.
* Do nothing that could not be published and analyzed in the
local print or electronic media, although there may be no
legal requirement to disclose details of the decision-making
process to the public.

The specific decisions likely to be presented for action by the
hospital boards within the context of the foregoing legal duties
and standards of conduct are neither simple nor objective. They
are often emotional and require the exercise of discretion by the
board. Examples include the following:
" Marshaling support and cooperation from the two medical

staffs, without which the affiliation may never take place
"
*
*
"

and which, in many cases, will entail consideration of a
merger of the staffs;2 8
Adjusting to material changes in governance, perhaps reducing the effective role of the hospital board by increasing
the role of a new parent organization;2 9
Losing the services of key and often long-term executives
due to redundancy of resources following the affiliation
closing date;
Protecting the integrity of institutional fundraising practices and confidences wherever possible;3"
Sorting out potentially conflicting affiliations for academic,
programmatic, purchasing, or other purposes. 3 '

28. If the two hospitals are in the same city, experience shows that the medical
staffs generally will welcome a merger of staffs in order to minimize their required
meetings. Exceptions to this observation are affiliations of teaching and nonteaching
hospitals and the presence of hospital-based physicians who foresee difficulty in their
differences or redundancy after a merger of the two medical staffs.
29. If the hospital board has had the "final say" in the past, the board members
may worry about an affiliation resulting in "subsidiary" status unless they are also the
directors of the new parent. Though difficult, this transition is highly desirable to
assure that the new post-affiliation system is not governed in the future as if it were
simply one hospital.
30. The prospect of losing fundraising ability after an affiliation is often more
imagined than real. In a two-hospital town, many donors are pursued by both hospitals and will welcome the affiliation for that reason alone. The most sensitivity is
required where the fundraising of one hospital in the past has been integral to a sponsoring church organization.
31. This is a real problem in many cases, because an affiliation may cause one or
both of the sets of suppliers or affiliates to lose a major customer or affiliate. Often,
third-party interests are represented on the hospital boards and directors representing
third-party interests may be inclined to keep the affiliation from happening. Direc-
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These are examples of the trouble spots that plague nonprofit
hospital boards during the process of negotiating affiliations,
whether adversarially or by joint study. Conceptually, however,
they are not different from the difficult decisions facing the
boards of for-profit organizations, nor do they create new legal
duties beyond those identified above and explained below.
A.

Conflicts of Interest: Putting the Public First

Every legal source of scrutiny for nonprofit, tax-exempt entities is justifiably concerned about conflicts of interest. This legitimate concern is based upon the desire that nonprofit, taxexempt organizations performing a public service not be abused
by private interests or give the impression that they are permitting private interests to abuse the public interest. If nonprofit,
tax-exempt organizations cannot be trusted by the public or by
the government from which their nonprofit and tax-exempt status are conferred as a privilege, then they might as well be
closed down and replaced by government.32 Put another way,
those who act on behalf of nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations
enjoy the conditional privilege of a special legal status which will
be revoked if the public-interest conditions to the privilege are
not observed fully, both in letter and in spirit.
Although every state and the federal government has asserted
this "public-first" or "no conflicts of interest" policy, no one has
yet stated it perfectly. The most recent effort is that of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") by virtue of the new I.R.C. section
4958, 33 enacted in July of 1996. Directors must be particularly
aware of this new law, which expands the power of the IRS by
introducing a new level of penalties, called intermediate sanctions. The intermediate sanction provisions create an intermediate step between revoking exempt status and no sanction at all.34
tors with potentially conflicting interests may include members of law firms, accounting firms, universities, construction companies, or insurance brokerages, all of which
may have a true conflict of interest in considering the affiliation. It is generally unwise to have directors with potential conflicts of interest play a major role in the
affiliation decision-making process.
32. Since the classic analysis of American life by Alexis de Tocqueville in the late
1820s, analyzed in his momentous Democracy in America, first published in 1935, the
use of private organizations ("public associations") to perform public functions has
been a cornerstone of American law, economics, and sociology. Changing this would
be a major modification of our social fiber.
33. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4958 (West Supp. 1997).
34. See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine, et al., Complying With the New Intermediate
Sanctions Law, 14 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 245 (1996).
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Section 4958 establishes a 25% federal excise tax on activities
that produce an "excess private benefit" and a 200% excise tax
when the private benefit transaction is not undone.3 5 The tax is
assessable against all officers, directors, and other "disqualified
persons" (also known as "insiders") who in the five years prior
to the transaction were in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. 36 While nonprofit hospital mergers do not always present opportunities for "private
benefit," there is no dearth of possible examples of potential private benefit arising out of such mergers. For example, a
"change-of-control" severance package negotiated for the top
managers, a "buyout" of the duplicative hospital-based physician contracts, or a banker or insurance broker or construction
manager on the board who negotiates a "sweetheart" deal for
his or her company (or his or her spouse's or child's company)
as part of the merger may all create excess private benefits and
invoke intermediate sanctions by the IRS under section 4958. 37
The tactical value of the procedures found in I.R.C. section
4958 cannot be overstated. The intermediate sanction provisions give the directors of an exempt organization both a duty to
disclose and an opportunity to defuse the time bomb of potential conflicts of interest. The disclosure occurs in two ways: (1)
through timely compliance with the disclosure forms of the hospital's conflicts of interest policy, 38 and (2) through well-drawn
35. The tax is on the amount of the excess benefit. For example, if a fair market
value item of $25,000 were sold by a hospital to a disqualified person for $15,000, the
initial tax would be $2500 (25% of the $10,000 excess benefit). If the deal is not
undone within that taxable year, the tax becomes $20,000. Although the liability of a
member of the organization's management or governance is 10%, limited to $10,000,
the liability of others is joint and several and is not so limited. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4958(e) (1994). That amount must be remitted to the federal government via the
IRS. See id. § 4958(a)-(b). The exempt organization and the state's attorney general
would also have claims against the disqualified person.
36. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4958(f)(1) (1994).
37. The IRS, prior to the enactment of Section 4958, took the position that all
physicians on a hospital's medical staff were insiders for purposes of the inurement
prohibitions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The "substantial influence" test of Section 4958 makes much more sense legally, but actually requires
greater ongoing attention and discretion. As a result, it is better to err in favor of
identifying individuals with enough influence that "conflicts policies" apply and require disclosure of potential conflicts. Experience shows that a hospital must administer its disclosure system conscientiously, because individuals are often slow to
volunteer an apparent or potential conflict. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l
Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
38. While the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
has required some form of policy or procedure on conflicts of interest for years, see
JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, § GO.2.6
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board minutes whenever a transaction occurs 39 between the exempt organization and a disqualified person. The defusing takes
place through following the exact statutory procedure for dealing with potential conflicts. There must be a documented and
good-faith finding by the board that the transaction is in the best
interests of the corporation; the disqualified person must not be
present; express reference must be made to comparable data in
the board's possession; and the transaction must be reasonable
after consideration of all relevant factors.4 ° When documented,
this procedure establishes a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, which the IRS would have difficulty overturning. 41 Left
unsaid in the statute or the committee report, but present in the
minds of many, is the inexorable evolution of the obverse,
namely, a possible presumption in the absence of such findings
that there was some excess benefit to the disqualified private
person involved. Eventual case law or IRS regulations might
clarify that Congress did not intend such a result is not intended,
but perhaps the IRS would actually prefer that such a presumption does evolve.
It may appear that because this is a Commentary discussing
directors' duties in nonprofit rather than for-profit hospitals,
conflict of interest issues are being overemphasized. However,
the conflicts discussion is particularly relevant because most directors' and officers' liability insurance policies exclude coverage for actions not taken in good faith and for actions clearly
contrary to public policy (for example, violations of the Sherman Act 42). Thus, it would appear that (1) directors are "on
their own" when they act despite a conflict of interest, and (2) a
finding of conflict and a recovery by any of the interested overseers, including the IRS, the attorney general, or the exempt organization itself, would virtually assure an uninsured recovery
by the others as well. Because of the serious consequences of
failure to confront and document possible conflicts of interest,
(1995), the IRS became more directly involved in conflicts policies in 1997 as part of
its process of granting or denying exempt status. While the IRS-recommended conflicts policy still has a number of shortcomings, it is now the "floor" for new applicants
for tax exemption.
39. Wisdom dictates application of extensive documentation of all board actions
to an amendment to a transaction as well, particularly when the original transaction
predated. I.R.C. § 4958.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 56-57 (1996). This important protection is
found in the committee report and is not included in the statute itself.
41. The presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted by credible evidence.

42.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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directors should be aware of such consequences and conduct affiliations to avoid intermediate sanctions and other criminal and
civil penalties.
State law pertaining to conflicts of interest on the part of nonprofit directors is more problematic because it is less clear.
Practitioners must research state law to ensure that their conduct conforms with applicable state conflicts laws. For example,
the Illinois General Not for Profit Corporation Act ("Illinois
Act") 43 requires three fundamental courses of action of directors considering a transaction.
Both the individual directors and the board as a whole have a
clear duty to watch for, identify, disclose, and resolve possible
and existent conflicts of interest. The Illinois legislature wisely
concluded that conflicts of interest cannot always be avoided
and that the most important issue is how boards process and
resolve possible conflicts. The Illinois Act allows transactions
involving interested directors so long as the transactions are fair
to the corporation and the board follows specific procedures.4 4
Next the involved director has the burden of proving that a particular transaction was fair, and that a decision was rendered after disclosure of the material facts. Further, the board must
approve the transaction by a majority vote of disinterested
directors.45
43. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/101.01-116.10 (West 1996).
44. See id. at 105/108.60.
45. The interested director may be counted in determining whether a quorum is
present. The Illinois Statute reads as follows:
Sec. 108.60 Director conflict of interest. (a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, approved, or ratified, the fact that a director of the corporation is directly or indirectly a party to the transaction is not
grounds for invalidating the transaction.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction described in subsection (a), the person asserting validity has the burden of proving fairness
unless:
(1) The materialfacts of the transaction and the director's interest or relationship were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee consisting entirely of directors and the board or committee authorized, approved
or ratified the transactionby the affirmative votes of a majority of disinterested
directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The materialfacts of the transactionand the director's interest or relationship were disclosed or known to the members entitled to vote, if any, and they
authorized, approved or ratified the transaction without counting the vote of
any member who is an interested director.
(c) The presence of the director, who is directly or indirectly a party to the
transaction described in subsection (a), or a director who is otherwise not
disinterested, may be counted in determining whether a quorum is present
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Although some may imagine that addressing conflicts is easy,
it often is not. Lawyers, physicians, bankers, consultants, and
others do not always identify or disclose their own conflicts or
those involving family members. If they have a duty to disclose
conflicts and fail to do so, they may be subject to personal liability under both state and federal laws.
B.

Dualities of Interest

Dualities of interest, as opposed to conflicts, are perhaps best
defined as competing fiduciary nonproprietary interests,
whether inside or outside the corporate family of the affiliating
organizations. An example of a duality of interest within the
corporate family would be a member of a religious order who
serves simultaneously on the boards of the religious order, a
sponsored health system, a hospital within the system, and a
sponsored local college receiving an annual subsidy from the
system's bottom line. The specific question before the director
might be whether or not to vote to involve the system's flagship
hospital in an integrated delivery system with a large tax-exempt
clinic of physicians located next door to the hospital. Though all
directors on the various boards of the institutions involved in
this example are technically nonprofit fiduciaries, it does not
take much imagination to envision good-faith differences of
opinion on what the priorities should be at each institution. Another example is a person who serves simultaneously on both a
parent board and a subsidiary board. Although all institutions
are part of the same corporate family, a duality of interest arises
because the various institutions may have divergent interests in
differing outcomes. A director who serves simultaneously on
multiple boards within a corporate family must be aware of the
resulting duality of interest and the possible conflicts that may
arise.
Dualities outside the corporate family also frequently exist for
busy individuals who are pillars of the community. This kind of
duality occurs when a director is a board member of several
charitable organizations. It is not unusual, for example, for a
but may not be counted when the board of directors or a committee of the
board takes action on the transaction.
(d) For the purposes of this Section, a director is "indirectly" a party to a
transaction if the other party to the transaction is an entity in which the
director has a material financial interest or of which the director is an officer,
director, or general partner.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.60 (emphasis added).
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person to be on the board of his or her local church, local hospital, local school, local United Way, Catholic Charities, or Jewish
Federation. The person's spouse, parents, or adult children
might also be active with several different charities, all of which
compete for funding, contracts, publicity, and volunteers. Dualities surround nonprofit health care transactions, but neither
state law nor federal law has adequately addressed this issue.
The Illinois statutory language on conflicts of interest covers
some, but by no means all dualities of interest. A director is
indirectly a party to a transaction if the other party "is an entity
in which the director has a material financial interest or of which
the director is an officer, director or general partner. '4 6 Thus, a
duality by a director would be covered under the Illinois statute,
but a proprietary interest owned by a close relative would not.
Furthermore, for the Illinois conflicts statute to apply, the other
entity must be a party to the transaction in question, rather than
simply have an interest in it, for a statutory conflict to exist.
A director's fiduciary duty should extend at least to disclosing
all dualities because a director with a duality conflict may place
charity A's interests ahead of the interests of charity B. The
other directors of charity B are entitled to be aware of the potential effects of the dualities within their ranks. Most conflicts
policies do not reach this far, and only require disclosure of direct conflicts of interest.
Too little is written on the subject of dualities, which generally
do not rise to the status of a statutory conflict of interest. To the
extent that there is no applicable statute, directors with dualities
should comply with the second statutory obligation of nonprofit
directors in Illinois: They should conduct the corporation's affairs in good faith and in the absence of willful or wanton
conduct.
1.

Acting in Good Faith: The Avoidance of Willful or
Wanton Conduct

It should be easy for a nonprofit director to act in good faith
and without willful or wanton misbehavior. These duties are
sometimes honored in the breach for several reasons. First,
these duties often are not clearly defined or definable, and dualities of interest are not always seen as relevant. Second, the
real reasons for directors' votes ordinarily are not disclosed or
46.

Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1998

15

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 7

recorded and fellow pillars of the community do not want to
hurt the feelings of peers by questioning their motives. Finally,
there are certain motivations behind various decisions that are
not always consciously considered.
Nonetheless, good faith conduct and the avoidance of willful
or wanton conduct are legal prerequisites under Illinois law for
immunity from legal exposure for nonprofit directors. Particularly, the Illinois Act provides that uncompensated directors of
tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations cannot be sued for making
decisions and exercising judgment unless their actions involve
willful or wanton conduct. 47 "Willful or wanton conduct" is defined as "a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate
intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregardfor the safety of others
or theirproperty. 4 8 Board orientation, therefore, should always
include references to both the good faith obligation and the
avoidance of willful or wanton conduct as defined in the statute.
The obverse of acting in good faith and without willful or
wanton conduct is essentially the statutory test by which Illinois
circuit courts, upon application by members or the nonprofit
corporation itself or the attorney general, may sanction or remove directors. If the court finds that a director is engaged in
fraudulent or dishonest conduct or has grossly abused his or her
position to the detriment of the corporation, the court may enter
a decree sanctioning the director and requiring the transactions
be reversed.49 While directors have great discretion under these
standards, acting in good faith is generally the best way to prevent potential problems.
2.

Acting in the Best Interests of the Corporation

The third and last applicable statutory obligation for Illinois
nonprofit directors is the standard of conduct under which a corporation may indemnify its directors for expense incurred when
acting on the corporation's behalf. By statute, a nonprofit corporation in Illinois may indemnify its directors (and others) "[i]f
such person acted in good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
47. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.70 (West 1996).
48. Id. 105/108.70(d ) (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App.
1965); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.35(d) (West 1996).
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the corporation .... "50 While this may appear to be a perfectly
clear standard in theory, the standard is difficult to apply in
practice for several reasons.
First, people may, and often do, disagree on what is reasonable. It is not unusual for opposing groups, or opposing individuals, to resort to litigation to determine what is in the best
interests of a nonprofit corporation.5 ' This is especially relevant
when the nonprofit organization's assets are cash, and the disputed issue is over what other organizations should receive cash
distributions after dissolution.52
Second, the Illinois Act's "best interests" test of asset management extends substantial discretion to nonprofit governance
participants. This discretion resulted in part because of the disastrous litigation against trustees growing out of the Great Depression and in part because of the legislative desire to
encourage American volunteerism on behalf of nonprofit organizations. The best interests test is generally comparable to the
so-called "business judgment" test used for for-profit business
corporations.53 At a minimum, "the best interests" test requires
directors to take good faith affirmative steps to avoid negligent,
uninformed decision-making. Directors must demonstrate that
they are acting in the corporation's best interests by creating evidence in board minutes or other documents showing that the
individual director's vote is reasonably thought to be in the corporation's best interests.54
Directors do not make decisions in a vacuum. The decision
whether or not to affiliate should always be measured under the
circumstances at hand. This means that the best interests of the
corporation might change from time to time for the nonprofit
director.5 5 It also means that it becomes very desirable legally
to document accurately and in a timely fashion the basis on
which big decisions in the life of nonprofit corporations are
made. 6
50. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/108.75(a)(West 1996) (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., People ex rel. Fahner v. Community Hosp. of Evanston, 440 N.E.2d
200 (Il1. App. Ct.1982).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g. Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, 210 N.E.2d at 12.
54. All of these factors were absent in Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club. See id.
55. See, e.g., Holden Hospital Corp. v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 174
N.E.2d 793 (Ill. 1961).
56. The suggested documentation is comparable to the mandated documentation
in Section 4958.
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SHARE OR CHANGE CONTROL

The title of this Commentary suggests that there may be
something special or legally important about a hospital board's
decision to enter into a transaction that may result in the hospital losing some control. Directors often phrase their most serious misgivings in such terms as "turning our hospital over to
them" or "selling out to them." Analysis, however, shows that
this concern is not a legal issue; rather, it is an emotional issue,
an expression of concern that culture clashes between the two
organizations might bring about unwanted changes in the dayto-day operations of the hospital.
The power to materially change a nonprofit institution is generally retained within its own power structure so that its members or directors, if so inclined, could substantially change the
institution's culture.57 While this may be less true of some religious-sponsored nonprofit hospitals, change has been inexorable
for them, too; without periodic change, the economy and the
competition often bring religious-sponsored hospitals to financial ruin.
If members and directors are routinely granted the power to
materially change both the people and the purposes of a nonprofit corporation, then they certainly have the power to both
share authority and abdicate it to other fiduciaries of the public
interest. 5 8 Applying all the appropriate tests, it is entirely possible that a board could conclude that corporate dissolution is in
the best interests of both the corporation and the public. 5 9 Similarly, a board might determine that a merger or other corporate
affiliation is reasonably necessary or desirable.

57. For example, the Illinois Act states that if the corporation has voting members
and unless the organizational documents provide otherwise, the voting members shall
have substantial powers over the board of directors. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 105/
107.03-.05 (West 1996). If, on the other hand, discretion lies in a so-called self-perpetuating board without members, then the statute clearly grants the directors substantial authority to bring about change in the corporation. See id. § 105/108.15; see
also Westlake Hospital Ass'n v. Blix, 148 N.E.2d 471, 476-78 (Ill. 1958). The person
or entity with the power to materially change the corporation holds total control over
the corporation, subject only to its duty to conduct the corporation in furtherance of
the public interest.
58. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 105/110.05-.15 (West 1996); Holden Hospital
Corp., 174 N.E.2d at 797-98.
59. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 105/112.05-.10 (West 1996).
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APPLICATION OF ALL LEGAL DUTIES TO BOARD
DECISION-MAKING

Fortunately for nonprofit hospital directors, an identifiable
process emerges from the analysis of the three sets of legal obligations in their practical application. The resultant process both
permits and encourages the proper participants in affiliation decision-making to document the following process: who made the
decision, what the options were, and why the particular decision
was made. 60 Although the benefit of documenting board decisions is clear, even the best intentioned decision-makers sometimes resent being asked to demonstrate that they have done no
wrong and recoil from lawyers who suggest that documentation
procedures, which may be perceived by directors as prophylactic
measures, are highly desirable.
There is, however, a middle ground. For cases in which all
actual, apparent and potential conflicts and dualities of interest
have in fact been identified and dealt with appropriately, the
participating decision-makers should adopt a formal written list
of reasons for the transaction. The list might be short or long,
but it should be honest and reviewed closely by counsel.61
In the context of a hospital merger, prudence arguably consists of little more than a specific finding that there are sufficient
valuable results from the transaction that justify any risks associated with a change in control at the board or membership level.
In some cases, the value to the communities being served may
lie not only in efficiencies or cost savings, but also in enhanced,
coordinated sponsorship or combined governance mechanisms.
If these reasons support the transaction and concurrently pass
the "straight face test" and the so-called "smell test," then they
ought to be placed on the formal list of reasons as evidence of
the directors' deliberate search for a prudent affiliation in the
best interests of the corporation and the community.
Along with inquiries from state and federal governmental agencies, nonprofit directors are inevitably subject to appropriate inquiry from their fellow citizens. Innocent inquiry may turn into
60. This documentation usually comes in the form of formal written documents
including a memorandum of understanding, a definitive transaction agreement, and
board findings and resolutions.
61. Legal review of board documents is important to ensure that the boards decisions do not rest on illegal rationale. For example, some first drafts have been known
to include anticompetitive rationale, such as "getting rid of destructive competition,"
a motivation that, if scrutinized, would be sure to attract the attention of the federal
antitrust agencies.
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intense scrutiny. If directors cannot give compelling and consistent reasons for their proposed actions to those who care
enough to ask, perhaps their conduct is imprudent. Few directors look forward to being remembered for imprudence in their
service to their community and to the public. However inexact
an art it may be, documentation of prudence is the answer for
nonprofit directors. It is the indelible sign of legal duties
honored in fact.
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